Can a Keystore V3 be hardware-bound or hide a second wallet?

External question — Ethereum Stack Exchange Author: Made in Algeria Original post: https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/172441 License: CC BY-SA 4.0 — https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ Adaptation: HTML converted to plain text; contact email addresses removed. Someone gave me an Ethereum Keystore V3 JSON file (fields: version:3 , crypto.ciphertext , cipherparams.iv , cipher:"aes-128-ctr" , kdf:"scrypt" , kdfparams with n:131072, r:8, p:1, salt , and mac ). They made several claims about it, and I'd like to know which (if any) are technically possible. Their claims: The keystore is "bound" to a specific computer's hardware/disk: the KDF is tied to a disk fingerprint + device signature, so a copy on another machine would only produce "meaningless data". They also said they "edited the keystore file to match my hardware" after I ran systeminfo . It enforces a "3 attempts" counter stored as a signed "transaction-like object" (nonce + gas + signature), and can self-destruct / burn the key and replace it with a decoy ("flash") address if attempts run out. Unlocking performs an on-chain "challenge–response" with an Ethereum client using the latest block hash, requiring a Merkle proof; an offline copy supposedly fails. He programmed a "platform" with a script so that when the keystore is uploaded to MyEtherWallet: if an on-chain "match" succeeds, it opens a wallet with data different from what is inside the keystore ("a hidden wallet with assets"); if it fails, it opens the address that is actually inside the keystore. What I observed: I opened the file locally on the public MyEtherWallet site, using none of his software, just the password. It simply unlocked the single (empty) address that is inside the file. My questions: When a Keystore V3 is decrypted, is the result determined entirely locally and deterministically by (file contents + password) via scrypt → AES-128-CTR → MAC check? Does scrypt/decryption read any hardware, disk, or system information? Does the Keystore V3 format contain any field for hardware binding, an attempt counter, self-destruct logic, or a "second/hidden" wallet? Can editing the JSON "bind" it to a machine? Is there any blockchain step (challenge–response, Merkle proof, network call) involved in decrypting a keystore? Can any external "platform"/script change the decryption result, so the same file + same password opens a different wallet depending on an on-chain condition? Specifically, since MEW decrypts client-side, could his "platform" have had any role at all? Thank you — I'm trying to understand whether these claims are feasible or not.